Friday, February 17, 2012

Iconology as a Spiritual Exercise

Iconology as a Spiritual Exercise:
The compositio loci in Ignatius of Loyola


Paul Richard Blum (Loyola University Maryland, Baltimore)


When in 2004 Mel Gibson’s film The Passion of the Christ was hyped I organized a reading group among my colleagues at our Jesuit university to read Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises and specifically to interpret the compositio loci as a means to the same effect without creating mass hysteria but also without cashing in millions of dollars. Probably, the esthetics of movies has been studied more than the esthetics of the Spiritual Exercises. My thought experiment in this paper is to read the sensuality of images as a kind of exercise of the soul, or – conversely – to understand the directions of Ignatius’ Exercises as an invitation to compose iconological programs that may reach beyond the pious purpose of the author. 

1.       The activity of the soul
Let me first describe the procedure and directions as they are in the text. We should notice that the work, Spiritual Exercises,[1] is quite an unusual genre of text. It opens with twenty preliminary remarks that would well suite a handbook for guided or self-guided meditation. Then follow more definitions and suggestions concerning meditation (21-44), before the exercises themselves are described (45-237). The book concludes with classifications of prayer (238-260), a recapitulation of the major events of the life of Christ (261-312), and a long list of rules regarding the self-perception of the pious person, actions, and – most famously – regarding the obedience to the Church.
The Exercises offer theologico-psychological insight combined with technicalities and procedures that induced Roland Barthes to compare the book with the obsessively systematic permutation of sexual pleasure in Marquis de Sade.  Barthes diagnosed “an incessant, painstaking, and almost obsessive separation” of acts, times, mysteries, etc., which for some inscrutable reasons made him compare Ignatius’ text with the scholastic technique of argumentative distinctions.[2] However, what is distinguished in the Exercises are not concepts, notions, or definitions but, rather, images. “The image is very precisely a unit of imitation. The imitable material (principally the life of Christ) is divided into fragments so that it can be contained within a framework and fill it completely.”[3] Barthes also does not fail to relate this method of distributing images and parts of images to the rhetorical and mnemotechnic tradition.[4] It is at this point where we need to part company with Barthes’s brilliant analysis, because I believe that Ignatius’ way of operating with images warrants an epistemological and metaphysical interpretation. The first parallel that comes to mind is the rigorous curriculum of early Jesuit education; the Ratio studiorum (definitive version of 1599) was quite a similar combination of abstract ideas and day to day technicalities.[5] More closely related to our topic, readers of Renaissance mnemotechnics and topics will recognize that the medium is the message: the exercises proposed by Ignatius are not preparations for something other than the exercises, they are not practice for the final tournament; rather, they are what piety is all about, namely, the exercise of the soul, or the soul in action.
This can be seen in the very first opening annotation, which offers the definition of 'exercises':
The term ‘spiritual exercises’ denotes every way of examining one’s conscience, of meditating, contemplating, praying vocally and mentally, and other spiritual activities (spirituales operationes) … For just as strolling, walking and running are exercises of the body (corporales), so ‘spiritual exercises’ is the name given to every way of preparing and disposing one’s soul to rid herself of all disordered attachments, so that once rid of them one might seek and find the divine will in regard to the disposition on one’s life for the good of the soul. (1)[6]
The definition is clearly circular in that it defines exercise by exercise; therefore it must be intended to be descriptive rather than classificatory. Indeed, it invites to praxis which is not conceptual. The aim of “preparing” the soul is for the soul to function in an uninhibited way, that is, to ‘operate’ properly. In a Christian context we may grant that “the good of the soul” is nothing but finding the divine will.  However Ignatius refers to the Aristotelian point of view that has the ‘exercise’ of the body by walking or running as the nature of the body’s operation, so that the telos of the operation is the operation itself.[7]
Already the second introductory remark, directed at the supervisor or personal guide of an exercise, comes to the main feature of the whole enterprise, which may be termed experiential: it assumes that to teach meditation and contemplation can only be done by example and by narrating the personal experience and thus inviting the other to relive the same experience.
The person who gives to another the way and order to meditate or contemplate should tell faithfully the history of this meditation or contemplation ... For if a person begins contemplating with a true foundation of the history and thinks it through and reasons about it with his own effort, he may find something that makes the story more clear or allows him to savor it (…) then it is of more spiritual taste and fruit. (…) For it is not so much knowing that fills and satisfies the soul but sensing and tasting the things themselves internally.[8]
The key concepts in this advice are: historia, gustare, and gustus et fructus historiae.[9] This is the constellation: the spiritual director narrates the history, or rather story, of the contemplation (and we need to come back to that), adding some hints, but no full interpretation or theory; the exercitant—as the other person is commonly called—is thus enabled to think for himself rationally with the purpose to savor the story and hence draw a taste and spiritual fruit of the experience. Ignatius adds that it is indifferent at this point whether the insight comes from one’s own intellectual capability or by divine inspiration. His point is that the fruit is no mediated and distanced understanding of something but the thing itself; and access to it can only be described in sensual terms, as tasting and internally relishing. At the point of this writing, Ignatius was not anymore an illiterate gung-ho, a self-taught preacher, but someone who had gone through the Paris schools.[10] So, if he retained from his early career as a heretic in Spain some of the techniques and psycho-therapeutical expertise present in mystical and spiritual movements of the time, he nevertheless knew the terminology and rules of Aristotelian epistemology.
This is patent in the third preliminary remark that refers to the well-known tandem of discursus and voluntas; interestingly, in this case he adds that voluntas requires more reverentia than acts of the intellect. We are immediately reminded of the anthropological fact, elaborated by Marsilio Ficino, that human relation to God is in its essence a form of reverence that is manifest, present and prefigured in the self-reference of the human being.[11] Given this framework, as to the language of taste and sensuality, we may assume Ignatius meant what he said when he taught to relinquish rational discourse after having made use of it. We will see soon that Ignatius is deliberately making use of sensuality, in order to reach a level of savor that outsmarts rationality, including that of present day pragmatism.
We cannot pass over the very “principle and foundation” of all spiritual exercises (in the defined meaning): What begins as a pious commonplace "The human person is created to praise, reverence and serve God …" morphs immediately into intellectual stoicism:
It follows from this that one must use other created things in so far as they help towards one’s end. To do this we need to make ourselves indifferent to all crated things … Thus as far as we are concerned, we should not want health more than illness ..., but we should desire and choose only what helps us more towards the end for which we are created. (23)
Indifference, taken seriously, is not ashamed of having good things. The stoic indifference is that of the superior operation of the mind, to which all is good that makes good. The spiritual position of indifference will turn out to be the condition for the possibility to contemplate the absolute by balancing the physical sensual with the spiritual imaginative. Since the aim and proper operation of the soul transcends rational discourse, the sensual has to be transformed into the visionary.
This, by the way, is not an unusual form of thought: in metaphysics the notion of God has to be thought as indifferent to the entanglement with matter, otherwise the philosophical theology would deviate into mere dualism rather than the foundation of reality, material or not.
Hans Urs von Balthasar, temporarily a Jesuit, elaborated on the mystical and metaphysical importance of Ignatius' call for indifference. He related the indifference to apatheia (passionlessness) in the Church Fathers, equanimity (Gelassenheit) in the Rhenisch mystics, and "abandon" in 17th-century French mysticism. To him, indifferentia is the universal principle and fosters the leap beyond all creation into the immediacy with God (Unmittelbarkeit zu Gott). Hence he infers that the meditating person is stripped of all personal values (jedes eigenen Guten entkleidet).[12] This may be correct and integrates Ignatius into standard notions of spiritual elevation that relinquishes the earthly and egotistic perspective.[13] However, that should not explain away that Ignatius emphasizes the ancillary importance of the material and sensual, once that is liberated of any peculiar value that could be mistaken for absolute and resilient to spiritual power.
The exercises proper contain the famous “compositio loci”. Much has been written and speculated about it, for the most part from the perspective of the further development of Jesuit spirituality and, in general, of asceticism and psychology.[14] However, I hope I can shed some light on it by reading the text as it stands. The composition of the place is but one preparatory to the exercise itself. Therefore it helps understanding the 'composition' to know that the preparation to the exercise consists in activating the three faculties of the soul, namely memory, intellect, and will:
Bring the memory to bear on the first sin [that had been exposed before] …, then apply the intellect to the same event, in order to reason over it (el entendimiento discurriendo), and then the will, so that by seeking to recall and to comprehend all this, I may feel all the more shame and confusion … (50)
The standard triad of psychic faculties — memory, intellect, and will — is portrayed as interacting towards the perfection of the soul. The composition of the place unmistakably prepares the ground by providing the object of contemplation, the stuff to think and act upon. There is nothing mystical about it and no reason to divert the operation towards something psychological that may sound more familiar.[15] It is understandable that for a modern audience one is tempted to jump to the ascetic aim of the whole exercise, so that we seem to know already that the exercitant is expected to “let himself led by Jesus”,[16] but in order to do justice to the author we have to acknowledge that Ignatius is clearly referring to the three powers of the soul. And those faculties have first and foremost cognitive power.
The intellectual preamble to contemplation is “composición viendo el lugar.” It should be noted, Ignatius adds, that “for contemplation or meditation of visible things, e.g. a contemplation about Christ Our Lord who is visible, the ‘composition’ consists in seeing through the gaze (vista, oculo) of the imagination the material place where the object I want to contemplate is situated. … e.g. a temple or a mountain where Jesus Christ or Our Lady is to be found, according to what I want to contemplate.” (47) So far we are hearing a quite commonsensical advice, namely, to visualize the object of meditation or contemplation. The soul is active in focusing the attention on an object of noteworthy importance. This advice would be well applicable to a student of geometry who tries to grasp Pythagoras' theorem, to visualize the triangles and squares and their relations. The student might even pray, if it is a question in an exam. What is remarkable is the fact that Ignatius has the exercitant deliberately and consciously put the image together or compose. Therefore Hans Urs von Balthasar paraphrases it with Zurichtung, preparing, finishing, conditioning.[17] This meditation is a planned program for a psychological workshop.
The deliberateness and purposefulness of the meditative act becomes even more patent, if the intended object of contemplation is not a corporeal visible given as in the example above, but invisible, such as a sin. In this case "the composition will be to see with the gaze of the imagination and to consider that my soul is imprisoned in this [perishable] body, and my whole composite self as if exiled in this valley among brute beasts." (47) The view of the imagination, when it chooses for its object a psychic reality requires the corporeal human condition as integral part of that whole person that is ready to meditate. Ignatius' advice is to work with the body as with the condition sine qua non to become liberated from it. There is, of course, some pious padding, like the reference to 'exile' and 'valley of tears', but they only reinforce the call for integrating and employing sensible reality. The presence of the body is accepted in the spirit of indifference.[18] Since the triad of memory, intellect, and will are taking command and exercising their power, the senses are put to work. And tears will flow.
The second preliminary to contemplation is the begging for emotions: for instance, “in contemplating the Resurrection one asks for joy with Christ joyful, but in contemplating the Passion one asks for grief, tears and suffering with the suffering Christ.” And in the case of the invisible sin “I will ask for personal shame and confusion as I see how many have been damned on account of a single mortal sin …” (48) We are talking about emotions that by definition overcome a person from external events and consequently unasked for and unexpectedly. The exercitant is encouraged and even required to produce the state of mind that is agitated by visual experience and emotional response to it. Ignatius was a glutton for punishment.
The composition of places, we can conclude, is part of the process that involves the whole of the human mind on the way to shape consciously the conscience. Ignatius is interested in the actions of the soul and their union and synergy. That makes it possible to bestow on will and intellect the control of sensual and emotional experience.
But we are not done, yet, with the first exercise, the first directed operation of the soul in contemplating. A final component of the process of meditation is the imaginary dialogue: "Imagining Christ Our Lord … on the cross make a colloquy asking how it came about that the Creator made himself man … Then, turning to myself I shall ask, what have I done for my sins …” The colloquy is defined as “speaking as one friend speaks with another, or a servant with a master, at times asking for some favour, at other times accusing  oneself of something badly done, or telling the other about one's concerns and asking for advice about them.” (53) The colloquy completes the activity of the soul in meditation by lifting the sensual imagination up to an imaginary discourse, seeing Christ “hanging on the cross, talk over whatever comes to mind.” (53) To be sure, not only seeing but equally hearing, tasting, and tactile feeling will be employed. (66-69)
One of the recurrent terms in the context of the composition of place is the 'application of the senses'. The term applicatio sensuum (and variants of it)[19] was a coinage of the humanist translator of the Exercises, Andreas Frusius, S.J.; his version became the 'vulgate' of the text.[20] The term conveniently connotes the voluntary and deliberate employment of the sensory faculties towards the object of contemplation. Ignatius' Spanish text has the verb traer, which perhaps even more suggestively associates the act of controlling and puts the senses in a position dependent on reason.[21] For instance, in section 121, where the Latin versions use the term applicare/applicatio, the Spanish has: "traer los cinco sentidos sobre la primera y secunda contemplación." Those "contemplations" had pondered the incarnation and the nativity; now the exercitant is invited to "ver las personas con la vista ymaginativa, … oýr con el oýdo lo que hablan o pueden hablar," etc. (122-123; cf. 66-67, 169). Notice that the imaginative senses 'imagine' possible dialogues. Furthermore, by 'application' one should not be induced to think of the senses as some object that could be attached to some other object like a hand to a handle. In the composition of the place the object of contemplation is not 'objective' in the modern sense of the word; it is a product of the creative imagination.
The reference to the relation master-servant makes us aware that this colloquy does not create some kind of partnership, it does not at all level out the hierarchy; rather, it reaffirms the difference in making it consciously operable. Remember that at the very beginning reverentia said to be a main feature of the will.[22] We should also emphasize that the same twofold movement is happening as in the local imagination: from the external visual image to the imagined self; here: from the partner in dialogue to the self-dialogue. Therefore, we may say that the spiritual exercise in the psychological workshop consists in asserting the metaphysical distinctiveness and hierarchy in which a human being is located; it asserts the position on the spiritual level so that the sensual, the emotional, the cognitive, and the voluntary powers each contribute with their peculiar competences.

2.       Aristotelian and Neoplatonic epistemology
It is suitable to raise the question: what kind of epistemology is implied in this exercise of the powers of the soul? We may take for granted that in medieval and Renaissance epistemology and physiology the cognitive act of sensation consists in sense perception, which is first processed in the mind with the help of imagination and phantasy, then qualified by the cogitative power and stored in the memory. A discussion arose reading Aristotle’s De anima, book 2, namely to what extent the sensing is an active process or, rather, a merely passive perception.  To illustrate the issue I chose the commentary of the Jesuits of Coimbra on this issue. Although this work appeared only in 1598, it is representative for the Jesuits' reading of Aristotle, who was at that time about to be established as the standard teaching for Jesuit philosophy courses.[23] After referring to the medieval and late medieval discussion the Conimbricenses establish that “sensation (potentia sensitiva) has three aspects: it receives the species of the object [that is: the image of the object insofar as mentally representing it]; once informed it brings about the act of sensing (actum sentiendi); and it receives this kind of act in itself.” The authors then state the obvious, namely, that the middle aspect refers to “an active power, because it does not undergo anything but, rather, is operating (operatur).” The conclusion is that both image and operation are not actually “immediately received” in the mind but only thanks to the intervention of the power.[24] This amounts to saying that already on the level of sensation human understanding is actively producing images. The Jesuits of Coimbra invoke Aquinas and some of his commentators for approval of this theory. However, the passage cited[25] happens to say the opposite: In the context of the question whether we need to assume an agent intellect, Aquinas draws the comparison with sense experience and declares without further argument that it is not necessary to assume there is an “agent sense” (sensus agens; i.e., an operative power in the senses), because all potentials of the senses are passive. (Not that there is anything noble about being active: the digestive powers of the soul are, obviously, active.) But the Conimbricenses invoke as their main authority the Church Father Nemesius of Emesa, who in his De natura hominis treated the ‘phantastic’ power of the soul as something operative through the senses.[26] Nemesius further elaborates on the mechanism of perception, which is quite interesting because he also refers to the “animal spirit”, which Descartes would still employ to explain the operation of sense perception on the body.[27] The Jesuits must have been aware that the Exercises worked at the core of current epistemology and physiology.
The Conimbricenses confirm their interpretation in their commentary on De anima, book III. But they also insert some remarks about truth and falsehood. It is obvious that in 'phantastic' imaginations there can be deception. On the other hand, we might think that truth and falsehood are beyond sensual experience, since it is only judgment and predication that can be misled. But if sensation is an operation, or a movement of the soul, it may be wrong. Aristotle said, indeed, that imagination combines the souls and the senses; and it is only true, if this operation works together with the senses.[28] The Jesuits elaborate on that by warning: imagination is a sort of cognition that is generated by the representation of the image that is produced by it; consequently, imaginations may be false; and such truth and falsehood may depend on the presence or absence in space and time of the things imagined.[29]
For our purpose, the literary references offered by the Jesuit commentators on Aristotle’s understanding of the senses are helpful because they lead us back to the potential sources Ignatius might have known. Whereas Aquinas represents the officially approved stream of Aristotelian philosophy, Nemesius leads us to Platonism. While we saw that the Jesuits misappropriate the Aristotelian account, it is obviously the Platonic tradition that yields a theory of perception, in which the senses are active, or rather, in which operational activity is the fundamental principle of the mind that naturally branches out into perception.
The easiest accessible Neoplatonic source, at least to us, but perhaps also to Ignatius and his teachers, is Marsilio Ficino.[30] In his Platonic Theology, intended as a defense of the immortality of the soul against certain Aristotelians, he unmistakably emphasizes the activity of the soul in the process of sense cognition:
Sensation is concerned with bodies, imagination with the images of bodies perceived. … The phantasy has at least an inkling of substance … [The] particular concepts of the phantasy are … bodiless intentions of bodies.[31]
Ficino also takes into account the volitional component of cognition:
… Nothing appears to me to demonstrate more that the nature of the human mind is midway than its natural inclination towards both [goals]. If this inclination is via the intellect then either begins from bodies and thence straightway transfers itself into things incorporeal, or it arises now and then from things incorporeal and descends in turn to bodies’ images. If it is via the will, then either it chooses things eternal … or … it desires things temporal, and in turn is often kept back from them by its reverence for things eternal.[32]
Neoplatonism held that sense perception and imagination are areas of intellectual competence that are not passively dependent on external input (as empiricists would have it); rather, they are creative modes of being of the soul. From there it is only a small step towards producing images deliberately and freely. In his dialogues on Plato's Symposium Ficino explains summarily: Between the soul and the body mediates a spirit; and the soul adopts from the spirit the bodily images thus cognizing the corporeal world. However, in observing those images it conceives (concipit) of itself and in itself much purer images—this he calls imagination or phantasy.[33] Ficino's classification of senses seems ad odds with Ignatius's appreciation of sensual perception, because the Platonist occasionally advocates a dualism between the bodily senses touch, taste, and smell and the intellectual senses reason, sight, and hearing.[34] On the other hand, he does agree with the Exercises in presupposing that the soul is active in finding it's orientation in the hierarchy of beings while, as he quotes from Plato, "she is eager (affectat) to intuit the divine seeing in it what is cognate to her."[35] Since this dialogue is about love, we hardly will find descriptions of compassion and suffering; and yet, emotions are at the core of the activity of the human soul: Pleasure is the key term when Ficino describes the incorporeality of beauty.[36]  Even God's face, the source of beauty, is termed gratia in the sense of 'pleasantness' insofar as it shines through the corporeal eyes, making them capable of affections.[37]
One main feature of the Platonic tradition, relevant for our interpretation of the Exercises, is the fact that human beings gauge themselves in relation to the world and God. Ficino and other Platonists speak about the divinization through contemplation, meaning the passage from the earth towards salvation. Ficino even concludes his interpretation of Diotima's speech by stating: "first we appear to revere God in things, while revering the things in God, and we appear to revere things in God in order to embrace ourselves in Him; eventually, in loving God we must have loved ourselves."[38]  Therefore, for historians of Platonism welcome evidence for the Platonic mentality of the Exercises is the objective number 3 of the Second Exercise; here the person is confronted with the hypostases of the world:
I look at who I am, diminishing myself by means of comparisons: (i) What am I compared to all human beings? (ii) What are all human beings compared to all the angels and saints in Paradise? (iii) What can I alone be, as I look at what the whole of creation amounts to in comparison with God? (iv) I look upon all the corruption and foulness of my body. (v) I look at myself as though I were an ulcer or an abscess, the source of many sins and evils, and of great infection. (58)
Raimundus Sabundus would have nodded first, and cringed towards the end because he, too, had made self-positioning in the hierarchy of beings the key to piety without making self-effacement a requirement.[39] Nicolaus Cusanus, Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico, and Giordano Bruno would have all applauded to this renewed appeal for the dignity of man searching the human position among the hypostases, although regretting that Ignatius had joined the ranks of the pessimist strain of the Protestants. Bruno’s Eroici furori (1584) might even be read as a response to the Exercises.[40]

3.       The emplotment of images
The procedure will be repeated with every further exercise: prayer, composition of place, begging for emotions, and concluding colloquy. But to round out our irreverent look at Ignatius’ master piece, we need to discover one more feature that will definitely lead us into the history of iconology. In the Second Week, the object of visual and speculative contemplation, the secular king, should lead to the Eternal King, and to that effect the visual images are to be “synagogues, towns and villages where Christ Our Lord went preaching.” (91) From there, it is a small step to animate the stationary imagery with dynamic action. We observed already that the guide of the exercises will tell the exercitant the history/story to be made object of contemplation. There, in the Second Annotation, it was “the history of this meditation or contemplation” that was made self-referential for the purpose of savoring its lasting meaning. Now, from the second week on “proponere historiam” means expanding the imaginary field and therefore it precedes the compositio loci. The first instance that occurs in the book suggests that in order to contemplate the Trinity one should imagine the perspective of God on the history of salvation (102). This is the ‘historic’ background of the composition of the place that consists in imagining first the vast world and then St. Mary’s cubicle (103). In the next instance the history/story is Mary’s and Joseph’s travel from Nazareth to Bethlehem, followed by the imagery of the same event (111-112). In another case historia is Christ’s calling to gather under his flag (vexillum) against Lucifer and his army, with the images of the battle fields of Jerusalem and Babylon (137-138). It is not anymore surprising that detailed scenes of the life of Christ become material for further contemplations (161; 191 ff., 261 ff.). The familiar scenes of the life of Christ and of salvation become part of a narrative plot. Ignatius recommends the technique of emplotment.[41]
An advice for the Seventh Day of the Third Week sheds more light on the epistemological meaning of the composition of stories and images: Ignatius suggests that “anyone who wants to spend more time on the Passion should take fewer mysteries in each contemplation, e.g. in the first, only the Last Supper, in the second, the washing of the feet”, and so on (209). The exercitant shall have full control of the spiritual experience and the free disposition over the material that is to be transformed into a spiritual activity.
It is a commonplace that imagery was one of the foremost homiletic, literary, and artistic productions of the Jesuits.[42] Theater performances, both for didactic purposes and for public display, were also meant to impress the lower faculties of the mind for higher goals.[43]
Antonio Possevino, the encyclopedist of the early Jesuits, defended the use of images, especially sacred images and those of God with the argument that visual representations have a status of education and elevation: They do not prove that God exists, but in which form he suggests himself to vision. Images do not express the essence of the thing but make the thing visual. Images present the invisible by means of the visible.[44] In his chapter on poetry and pictorial art he stresses the meaning of imitation by identifying the emotional meaning of a story and a representation with 'the thing itself.'[45] In this vein Possevino gives advice on how to create an image of Christ that evokes passion: the artist has to pray and to conceive not just the "idea of the future artwork" but a sense of the pain (sensum dolorum). The painter has to live the magnitude of the emotion internally, and it is from there that suffering in the viewer can erupt: "If you want me to weep, you, artist, have to weep first."[46] The thing itself, as noted in section 2 of the Exercises, is its sentimental meaning.
Most conspicuous among the many artistic achievement of the Jesutis are the programmatic architectural paintings, like the vault of Sant Ignazio in Rome;[47] the Vita Beati Ignatii Loiolae (1609), illustrated by Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640) and others with the purpose of empathizing with the struggles and torments of the author of the Exercises;[48] the Pia desideria of Hermann Hugo; the spiritual chants by Friedrich von Spee, which are exuberant in imagery;[49] yet here I should make some observations on the illustrations of the New Testament by Hieronymus Nadal (1507- 1580).
Nadal planned and wrote the book of Annotations and Meditations on the Gospel with illustrations by various artists.[50] The work was commissioned by Ignatius himself and appeared eventually in 1593.[51] The luxurious layout and the artistry of the illustrations culminate in the illustration no. 131 that shows Christ’s descent into the Limbo, which is at the same time an illustration of Dante’s Inferno.[52] However, the majority of the illustrations are more modest and they perfectly fulfill the requirements of the compositio loci, because they focus on a major event (e.g., the Annunciation) and offer the emplotment through organically added side scenes in the background. Nadal’s work has every image adorned with notes that explain the factual details on the plate. Then follow the relevant reading from the Bible, more extensive explanations of the details, and a meditative prayer.[53] Nothing is left unorganized. In other words, this book is the execution of the transition from the purposefully guided imagination to visible images.  
Ignatius is reported to have collected himself images that would enhance his personal meditations.[54] In commissioning the commented illustrations to the Bible he initiated the decisive transition from the imaginarily construed locus to the artfully designed visual help for the composition of the object of meditation and its emplotment. Therefore it has been said that Nadal's spiritual reading of the Bible differs from antecedents "thanks to the system of annotations..., which serves the purpose of embedding the historical truth of the Scripture. Nadal's meditation thus avoids the danger of dissolving the reality of the Gospel into mystical meanings ..."[55] This form of combined image and text, art work and inspirational reading, became very popular among the Jesuits, when their spirituality merged with, or adopted, the Renaissance emblem book tradition.[56]  Hermann Hugo’s Pia desideria are an example of the emblematic tradition turned into mediation.[57] As the Exercises recommend, it is the pictorial narrative of the soul in search of God, told in images that are suggestive through their plainness.

To sum up: Iconology, understood as the artful, educated, and purposeful construction of pictorial images, not only relies on canons of representation and their ingenious application and transformation; Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises suggest that it also requires a peculiar epistemology that aims at gathering and coordinating a host of psychic faculties and processes: memory, imagination or vision, rational discourse, projection, empathy, abstraction, and conceptualizing. Furthermore, at least in the ascetic context, the ultimate aim is not the external object of a painting or a narrative, but the formation and self-regulation of the psychic faculties. Hence I dare to conclude my contribution by speculating that Baroque spiritual art was at the origin of the modern understanding of art as arousing rationalized emotions. "Aesthetischer Genuss ist objektivierter Selbstgenuss," as Wilhelm Worringer phrased it.[58] Against such secularized piety he reclaimed art as primarily decorative and diagrammatic (graphisch). When Mel Gibson reenacted the Passion of Christ in graphic[59] movie pictures, he relied on the self-indulging function of images and invited the audience to suffer with Christ and to feel guilty with his murderers. The success according to the program of the Spiritual Exercises or the degree of secularization should be measured by number of viewers who experienced a conversion.



[1] Ignatius de Loyola, Exercitia spiritualia, ed. Iosephus Calveras and Candidus de Dalmases (Romae: Institutum historicum Societatis Iesu, 1969) (Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, vol. 100); plain numbers will refer to the sections of this edition; modern editions offer the same numbering system. Quotations and my translations are from the original Spanish and the literal Latin versions in this edition.
[2] Roland Barthes. Sade, Fourier, Loyola. Translated by Richard Miller (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 52.
[3] Barthes, 54.
[4] Barthes, 55.
[5] Paul Richard Blum, Philosophenphilosophie und Schulphilosophie. Typen des Philosophierens in der Neuzeit (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1998), chapter 4: Schulphilosophie.
[6] Ignatius of Loyola, The Spiritual Exercises, in Ignatius of Loyola, Personal Writings, ed. Joseph A. Munitz and Philip Endean (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1996), 281-328. This translation is based on the Spanish so called Autograph. Quotations without further additions refer to this translation. In this case I corrected "for the body" to "of the body".
[7] For instance, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, book II, which elaborates on the exercise as performative virtue with examples from athletics. Heinrich Bacht, "Early Monastic Elements in Ignatian Spirituality," in Ignatius of Loyola. His Personality and Spiritual Heritage, 1556-1956: Studies on the 400th Anniversary of His Death, ed. Friedrich Wulf  (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1977), 200-236, underscores the "ascetic-active component" (p. 214).
[8] Nr. 2; my translation, my emphases. 
[9] The translation by Munitz and Endean took refuge to pale fashions of speech, like: "throw light" and "bring home."
[10] On the history and development of the book see Candidus de Dalmases, "Introductio" in Ignatius 1969, 27-33.
[11] Marsilio Ficino, Theologia Platonica/Platonic Theology, ed. James Hankins and Michael J. B. Allen (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002-2006), 6 vols., vol.4,  book 14, esp. chapter 8, 279-289. Cf. Paul Richard Blum, Philosophy of Religion in the Renaissance (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 124.
[12] Hans Urs von Balthasar, Herrlichkeit: Eine theologische Ästhetik, vol. 3/I (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1965), 456.
[13] An exhaustive assessment of the Exercises in the mystical tradition in Bacht 1977.
[14] Josef Sudbrack, S.J., „Die ‚Anwendung der Sinne‘ als Angelpunkt der Exerzitien,“ in Ignatianisch. Eigenart und Methode der Gesellschaft Jesu, ed. Michael Sievernich and Günter Switek (Freiburg: Herder, 1990), 96-119, with discussion of various interpretations.
[15] Translators suggest that "composition" has to do with modern American ‘composure’ or composing oneself. Unfortunately the text does not allow for that at all. Cf. Ignatius 1996 (Munitz/Endean), xv f.: “composition (composición) A preliminary to prayer, as one ‘composes’ oneself by ‘composing’ (= recalling to mind) the locale of the scene being contemplated or by imagining a suitable setting for a topic, e.g. a happy, or a shameful, or an awesome situation.” Similarly Ignatius of Loyola, The Spiritual Exercises and Selected Works, ed. George E. Ganss (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 397.
[16] Lambert Classen, „The ‘Exercise with the Three Powers of the Soul’ in the Exercises as a Whole“, in Ignatius of Loyola, His Personality and Spiritual Heritage, 1556-1956: Studies on the 400th Anniversary of His Death, ed. Friedrich Wulf  (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1977), 237- 271; 241. A comparison with Saint Bonaventure is suggested by Ewert H. Cousins, "Franciscan Roots of Ignatian Meditation," in Ignatian Spirituality in a Secular Age, ed. George P. Schner (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1984), 51-64; common ground could be devotion to the humanity of Christ (p. 51) and the method of re-presenting the life of Christ (58-61).
[17] Hans Urs von Balthasar, Herrlichkeit: Eine theologische Ästhetik, vol. 1, (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1961), 361. On early Jesuit interpretations and sources in Bonaventure and Augustine see pp. 361 ff.
[18] Cf. Wietse de Boer, "Invisible Contemplation: A Paradox in the Spiritual Exercises," in Meditatio – Refashioning the Self: Theory and Practice in Late Medieval and Early Modern Intellectual Culture, ed. Walter Melion and Karl Enenkel (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 235-256.
[19] Cf. sections 121, 129, 134, 159, 204, 208 a and f.
[20] Candidus de Dalmases, "Introductio" in Ignatius 1969, 118-119 (the first edition was printed in Rome 1548).
[21] Candidus de Dalmases, "Introductio" in Ignatius 1969, 110: "Textus hispanus seape utitur verbo traer ad indicandum usum potentiarum vel sensuum."
[22] Reverence is not exactly the purpose of the colloquy as Munitz/Endean suggest (p. xv), but it is not excluded.
[23] A brief overview on Jesuit teachings on the soul: Alison Simmons, "Jesuit Aristotelian Education. The De anima Commentaries," in The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773, ed. John W. O'Malley et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 522-537. – It may be helpful to recapitulate standard school teaching on the parts of the soul: the five senses; the sensus communis (to which the information from the external senses are transmitted), which is the first cognitive faculty of the soul; phantasy which transforms the images into immaterial concepts; the lower and the higher judgment (aestimatio, cogitatio); reason (ratio) which ponders the information; intellect which understands. This is paraphrased from a Jesuit encyclopedia of learning: Antonius Possevinus, Bibliotheca selecta de ratione studiorum, 2nd edition (Venetiis: Salicatius, 1603), lib. 12, cap.43, vol. 2, p. 13.
[24] Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu In tres libros Aristotelis De anima [Coimbra 1598]  (Coloniae: Zetzner, 1617), II, cap. 6, q. 1, art. 2, col. 186.
[25] Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, I. 79. art. 3: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra animam, et ideo non oportuit ponere sensum agentem. Et sic patet quod in parte nutritiva omnes potentiae sunt activae; in parte autem sensitiva, omnes passivae; in parte vero intellectiva est aliquid activum, et aliquid passivum."
[26] Nemesii Episcopi Premnon physicon, ed. Carolus Burkhard (Leipzig: Teubner, 1917), chapter 6, p. 72: “Phantastica igitur est virtus irrationalis animae per sensus operativa; phantaston autem, hoc est imaginabile, est quod phantasiae subiacet, ut sensus et sensibile; phantasia vero, id est imaginatio, est passio irrationalis animae ab aliquo imaginabili facta.” According to Tusculum-Lexicon griechischer und lateinischer Autoren (Munich/Zurich: Artemis, 1982), 549, this work was popular in the Middle Ages.
[27] Ibid. 73: "Instrumenta vero eius sunt anteriores cerebri ventres et animalis spiritus, qui in ipsis est, et nervi, qui sunt ex ipsis rorantes animalem spiritum et compositio sensuum.”
[28] Conimbricenses text. 160-161.
[29] This is probably a precaution on behalf of the "discernment of the spirits" (313-336), the concern to distinguish God's inspiration from evil insinuations, a topic that exceeds the scope of this paper.
[30] Cf. Karen-Claire Voss, "Imagination in Mysticism and Esotericism: Marsilio Ficino, Ignatius de Loyola, and Alchemy," Studies in Spirituality 6 (1996): 106-130, http://www.istanbul-yes-istanbul.co.uk/imagination. This paper casts a net far too wide to be useful in our context; the author enrolls Ignatius in the magic tradition and focuses on Ficino's cosmology in De vita.
[31] Ficino, Platonic Theology, vol. 2, book 8. 1.2-3, pp. 263/265.
[32] Ibid. vol. 5, book 15. 10.2, p. 111.
[33] Marsilio Ficino, De amore VI 6; edition used: Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon, ed. Raymond Marcel (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1956), 207. Translations from this work are mine.
[34] Ibid. V 2, p. 180.
[35] Ibid. IV 5, p. 173. Cf. Plato's Second Letter 313a.
[36] Se the anaphoric "Placet …" in De amore V 3, p. 183.
[37] Ibid. V 5, p. 18: "admiratione commoti diligimus." At this point it should be noted that Ficino develops the affective quality of contemplation into his theory of divine furor (VII 13-15). Although he declares that love is another word for sincerity, piety, and worship (VII 15, p. 260), I do not see a viable connection with Ignatius' spirituality.
[38] Ibid. VI 19, p. 239.
[39] Raimundus Sabundus, Theologia naturalis seu liber creaturarum, ed. Friedrich Stegmüller (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1966), titulus 63, p. 81; cf. Blum 2010, 16.
[40] Voss 1996, footnote 52, mentiones in passing that "Bruno had produced the same techniques found in The Spiritual Exercises."
[41] A term from the philosophy of history of Paul Ricoeur: data are gathered and made understandable in a narrative plot.
[42] Just one example out of the plethora of literature: John W. O'Malley et al., ed., The Jesuits II: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773 (Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2006), part 2: The visual arts and the arts of persuasion. An extensive overview on Jesuit spirituality in printed and decorative arts offers Friedrich Polleross, “Nuestro Modo de Proceder: Betrachtungen aus Anlaß der Tagung ‘Die Jesuiten in Wien’ vom 19. Bis 21 Oktober 2000,” Frühneuzeit-Info 12.7 (2001) 93-128.
[43] For an example see Jacobus Pontanus, S.J., Soldier or Scholar: Stratocles or War, ed. Thomas D. McCreight and Paul Richard Blum (Baltimore: Apprentice House, 2009), with an introductory section on theater as a spiritual exercise and bibliography.
[44] Possevinus, Bibliotheca selecta (1603), lib. 8, cap. 16-17, vol. 1, p. 413-418. He names as his source the fellow Jesuit Petrus Thyraeus.
[45] Ibid., lib. 17, cap. 35, vol. 2, p. 454: "At ego summam esse artem constantissime assero, quae rem ipsam imitetur, martyria in martyribus, fletum in flentibus, dolorem in patientibus, gloriam, et laetitiam in resurgentibus exprimat, et in animis figat."
[46] Ibid. cap. 36, p. 546: "Ut igitur funestissimus Christi … interitus admirationem, et acerbum dolorem in aliis pariat, necesse est ut in Pictoris animo insit, unde existat admirationis magnitudo, et impetus doloris erumpat. Si vis enim me flere, prius flendum est tibi, inquit Poeta." Cf. Horace, Ars poetica, 102-103. On the decoration of churches with scenes of martyrdom "that spared the viewer none of the brutality" see Evonne Levy, "'A Noble Medley and Concert of Materials and Artifice': Jesuit Church Interiors in Rome, 1567-1700," in Saint, Site, and Sacred Strategy. Ignatius, Rome, and Jesuit Urbanism. Catalogue of the Exhibition Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, ed. Thomas M. Lucas (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1990), 47-61; 49.   
[47] Levy 1990.
[48] Antonio M. Navas Gutiérrez, ed., Jean Baptiste Barbé and Peter Paul Rubens, artists, Vida de San Ignacio de Loyola en imágenes (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1992). Cf. John W. O'Malley, ed., Constructing a Saint through Images: The 1609 Illustrated Biography of Ignatius of Loyola (Philadelphia: Saint Joseph's University Press, 2008).
[49] Cf. Michael Sievernich, S.J., „En todo amar y servir. Die ignatianische Spiritualität als Formprinzip des Lebens und des Werkes von Friedrich von Spee", in Ignacio de Loyola, Magister Artium en Paris 1528-1535, ed. Julio Caro Baroja et al.  (Donostia-San Sebastián: Kutxa, 1991), 615-634; 620-623.
[50] Hieronymus Natalis, Evangelicae historiae imagines, ex ordine Evangeliorum, quae toto anno in missae sacrificio recitantur ... (Antverpiae: N.N., 1593); Idem, Annotationes et meditations in Evangelia … (Antverpiae: Martinus Nutius, 1595). Gerónimo Nadal, Annotations and Meditations on the Gospels, ed. Frederick A. Homann, and Walter S. Melion (Philadelphia: Saint Joseph's University Press, 2003-2007), 3 vols. On the history of the book see Maj-Brit Wadell, Evangelicae historiae imagines. Entstehungsgeschichte und Vorlagen (Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothobugensis, 1985).
[51] Thomas Buser, "Jerome Nadal and Early Jesuit Art in Rome," The Art Bulletin 58 (1976): 424-433; 424-426. On Nadal's acquaintance with Ignatius' spirit see Hugo Rahner, The Spirituality of St. Ignatius Loyola (Westminster, Maryland: Newman, 1953), 88-108.
[52] This illustration is missing in the reprint, where it should have been on p. 271 of vol. 2, but it is available on the CD that accompanies the print. The illustration is present in the Antwerp 1595 edition, as seen at http://www.fsanmillan.es/biblioteca/libro.jsp image nr. 631.
[53] A thorough study of Nadal’s theory and practice of imagination and prayer is the “Introductory Study: The Art of Vision in Jerome Nadal’s Annotationes et meditationes in Evangelia” by Walter S. Melion in Nadal, 2003-2007, vol. 1, pp. 1-96. Cf. Walter S. Melion, "Parabolic Analogy and Spiritual Discernment in Jéronimo Nadal's Adnotationes et Meditationes in Evangelia of 1595," in The Turn of the Soul: Representations of Religious Conversion in Early Modern Art and Literature, ed. Lieke Stelling, Harald Hendrix, and Todd M. Richardson (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 299-338. Walter S. Melion, "Aritifice, Memory, and Reformatio in Hiernoymus Natalis's Adnotationes et meditationes in Evangelia," Renaissance and Reformation 22 (1998) 5-33.
[54] Buser 1976, 425
[55] Ralph Dekoninck, "The International Genesis and Fate of two Biblical Picture Books (Hiël and Nadal) Conceived in Antwerp at the End of the Sixteenth Century," in The Low Countries as a Crossroads of Religious Beliefs, ed. Arie-Jan Gelderblom, Jan L. de Jong, and Marc van Vaeck (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 49-63; 61.
[56] From the host of literature, here some examples: Pedro F. Campa and Peter M. Daly (eds.), Emblematic Images and Religious Texts. Studies in Honor of G. Richard Dimler, S.J. (Philadelphia: St. John’s University Press, 2010); K. A. E. Enenkel and A. S. Q. Visser, ed., Mundus Emblematicus: Studies in Neo-Latin Emblem Books (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003); Peter M. Daly et al., ed., Emblematik und Kunst der Jesuiten in Bayern: Einfluß und Wirkung (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000). Possevino does not mention Nadal's work when he treats emblematic art (Bibliotheca selecta, lib. 17, cap. 38-39), and he only cites it in his Apparatus Sacer (Coloniae: Gymnich, 1608), 522 and 743.
[57] Hermann, Hugo, Pia desideria emblematis, elegiis & affectibus SS. patrum illustrata (Antwerp: Aertssen, 1624). Cf. Gabriele Dorothea Rödter, Via piae animae: Grundlagenuntersuchung zur emblematischen Verknüpfung von Bild und Wort in den "Pia desideria" (1624) des Herman Hugo S.J. (1588-1629) (Frankfurt: Lang, 1992).
[58] Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraktion und Einfühlung. Ein Beitrag zur Stilpsychologie [originally Phil. Diss. Bern, 1906-07], 11th edition (Munich: Piper, 1921). His paradigmatic opponent was Theodor Lipps, whose classification of empathy and emotion in art, as quoted by Worringer (7, but cf. the entire introduction) sounds like a secularized summary of Ignatian sensuality: "Indem [das sinnlich gegebene Objekt] für mich existiert …, ist es von meiner Tätigkeit, von meinem inneren Leben durchdrungen."
[59] The modern understanding of ‚graphic‘ as (sexually, violently) explicit (first occurrence 1856, Oxford English Dictionary, Draft Additions December 2002, http://www.oed.com.ezp.lndlibrary.org/view/Entry/80829)  appears to be yet another derivative of the compositio loci.

Monday, November 7, 2011

Coluccio Salutati und die Menschenwürde


Coluccio Salutati und die Menschenwürde
 Paul Richard Blum

I.

Coluccio Salutati (1331-1406) gilt als der erste Philosoph unter den italienischen Humanisten, sofern man unter Renaissance Humanismus die anthropozentrische Wende des Christlichen Denkens versteht, welche Reformation, Aufklärung, Säkularisierung und moderne Anthropologie möglich machte. Diese Wende wurde von Francesco Petrarca (1304-1374) postuliert, indem er in seinen Dichtungen und theoretischen Schriften die Selbstbetrachtung in der Tradition des Augustinus von der Richtung auf Gotteserkenntnis umwendete in die Betrachtung der konkreten menschlichen Natur hinsichtlich ihrer Begrenztheit und ihrem Drang zur Selbstbehauptung (Secretum). Diese Wende zum Menschen als Zentrum der Spekulation war eine unbeabsichtigte Folge des spätmittelalterlichen Voluntarismus, von dem offensichtlich auch Salutati beeinflußt war. Salutati war beruflich ein in Bologna ausgebildeter Jurist, der von 1375 bis zu seinem Tod Kanzler (d.h. führender Politiker) der Stadt Florenz war. Seine Werke lassen darüber hinaus eine breite Bildung in der antiken klassischen Literatur und Philosophie erkennen.
Der Begriff der Menschenwürde (dignitas hominis) kommt bei Salutati nicht wörtlich vor. Der Begriff hat aber Komponenten, zu denen Salutati beigetragen hat: Menschenwürde ist ein metaphysischer Begriff, indem er nicht von einzelnen Individuen oder kontingenten Situationen abhängt, sondern von Natur aus im Begriff des Menschen enthalten ist. Andererseits muß diese Würde aber von jedem Einzelnen und gegenüber jedem konkreten Menschen wahrgenommen werden; und insofern ist Würde nicht selbstverständlich. Daraus ergibt sich eine dialektische Spannung zwischen zeitlicher oder säkularer und metaphysischer oder theologischer Würde, eine Spannung, die in der Analyse menschlichen Handelns ausgelotet werden muß. Nun ist aber konkretes menschliches Handeln von genuin menschlichen Potentialen abhängig, die man modern kognitiv und emotional-psychologisch nennt, in der antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie als Vernunft, Wille und Passionen unterschied. Die Rahmenbedingungen menschlichen Handelns dagegen sind die Aktivitäten der Mitmenschen sowie die vom Menschen unbeeinflußbaren Gegebenheiten objektiver Art, die, soweit unkalkulierbar, als Zufall erscheinen. Daraus ergibt sich, daß Menschenwürde sich als metaphysische Eigenschaft des Menschen erweisen muß, die sich nicht theologisch-objektiv sondern nur durch Blick auf das Funktionieren und die Orientierung menschlichen Handelns erschließen läßt. Für Salutati bedeutet das, daß wir nach der Rolle von Wille und Vernunft, nach den Maßstäben des Handelns und seinen objektiven Bedingungen in Schicksal oder Vorsehung, nach dem politischen Recht und nach Rangordnungen von Aktivitäten suchen müssen.

II.

Treu der christlichen und der paganen Tradition (Bibel, Augustinus, Ovid) definiert Salutati die Würde des Menschen durch die Mittelstellung im hierarchischen Kosmos: Die Schöpfung wird dadurch vollendet, dass zwischen die Geistwesen und die beseelten körperlichen Wesen ein "verstandbegabtes" Wesen tritt, das als Abbild Gottes, "teils aktiv, teils materiell-passiv" (partim agentes et partim materiales), sowohl rational als auch der Natur konform wirksam ist und dadurch alles mit der Ersten Ursache zurückverbindet (quelibet ... religetur). [De fato, I, 1, p. 11.] In theologieneutrale Sprache übersetzt besteht die essentielle Menschenwürde darin, dass menschliches Tun und Herstellen ausgehend von der an die materiellen Bedingungen gebundenen Rationalität sowohl Wirkungen verursachen kann als auch die Welt der Veränderung an die Welt der Notwendigkeit bindet. Menschliche Vernunft verbindet Notwendigkeit und Kontingenz der sichtbaren Realität, weil die Vernunft die Welt sich unterwerfen oder auch sie als gegeben hinnehmen kann. Die Welt des nicht-kontingen Notwendigen ist in der klassischen Sprache jene Hierarchie, die von Gott über die Engel und die Planeten in die belebte und unbelebte Natur reicht, und in die der Mensch miteingebunden ist als eine Ursache, die ihr Potential von der Ersten Ursache bezieht [De fato I,2.]. Der Sinn des Bildes ist nicht die Bestätigung der traditionellen Hierarchie, sondern die autonome Rolle des Menschen in ihr. Deshalb diskutiert Salutati ausführlich die Funktion des Willens und die Freiheit. Am Beispiel des Sokrates, der nicht der Notwendigkeit sondern seinem Willen gehorchte, als er das Todesurteil annahm, illustriert er seine Kernthese [De fato II, 9, p. 77], dass "wir aus der Notwendigkeit unseren Willen beziehen" (de necessitate facimus voluntatem), was der Formel des Apostels Paulus entspricht: "Gott bewirkt in uns sowohl das Wollen als auch das Vollbringen" (Philipper 2, 13). In der Kombination mit dem Freiheitsanspruch des Sokrates erläutert der Bezug auf Gottes Einwirken die Theorie, dass – wie Salutati erläutert [De fato II, 8] – der menschliche Wille nicht nur seine Autonomie sondern auch seine Notwendigkeit schaffende Kraft aus der Gottesebenbildlichkeit bezieht. Der Wille ist nicht abhänig von der Notwendigkeit (vgl. Thomas von Aquin, Summa Theologiae I, 82, 2, c), sondern er schafft Notwenigkeit. "Gott bewegt unsere Willensakte so, dass er sie keinesfalls erzwingt." [De fato II, 9, p. 85.] Die Würde des Menschen besteht somit darin, ohne Konditionierung Wirkungen zu erzeugen und einen vorschreibenden Willen auszuüben, d.h. wie ein Gott zu handeln. In gängiger Sprache der Gegenwart dürfen wir sagen, dass Menschenwürde in unhintergehbarer Autonomie und in reflektiertem Verhalten zu den Bedingungen des Handelns besteht. Der von neuzeitlichen Religionsphilosophen gefürchtete Determinismus (in theologischer Sprache: Prädestination) wird so aufgelöst, dass "die Prädestination ein Akt des göttlichen Verstandes ist, der einen zukünftigen Zustand vorbereitet", wobei der Mensch zur Ausführung berufen ist (Paulus, Römerbrief 8, 30), und zwar der Mensch in seiner konkreten Existenz. Wegen der metaphysischen Differenz zwischen ewiger Vorherbestimmung und zeitlicher Ausführung durch ein Individuum ist Prädestination kein fatales Schicksal sondern Erhebung des Menschen in den Rang eines temporalen Gottes. [De fato II, 10, pp. 89 f.]
Dem widerspricht auch nicht Saltuatis Schrift über das mönchische Leben (De seculo et religione), in der die Versuchungen der Welt und die Früchte der Frömmigeit beschworen werden, und die deshalb Verlegenheit unter den Interpreten ausgelöst hat [De seculo, p. V f.]. Der Autor reflektiert das Paradox, als Politiker zum kontemplativen Leben zu ermahnen [De seculo I, prohemium, p. 2], und prangert die – wie wir heute sagen würden – naturalistische Auffassung der Welt an, welche ein unvollständiges Bild der Potentiale des Menschen leistet. Es sind die "körperlichen Philosophen" (carnales philosophos), die sich auf säkulare Quellen berufen, um die Welt zu einem vernuftbegabten und ewigen Lebewesen oder gar zu einem Gott zu erklären [De seculo I, 1, p. 4] und dadurch faktisch der natürlichen Hierarchie berauben. Demnach ist diese Schrift eines Laien hauptsächlich der Bekämpfung des Hochmuts gewidmet. Gegen die Naturalisten also positioniert Salutati den Menschen als gegenüber den materiellen Bedingungen unabhängig, weil mit freiem Willen ausgestattet [De seculo I, 36, p. 86], und zur Transzendenz offen.
Ein Grenzfall der menschlichen Autonomie und Abhängigkeit ist die Tyrannei. Da die menschliche Tugend sowohl theologisch (auf dem Weg zur Glückseligkeit) als auch politisch und individuell, nämlich als bürgerliche Tüchtigkeit und als Moralität definiert wird [De tyranno, Praefatio § 1, p. 4 Ausgabe Ercole], ist Tyrann derjenige, der seine eigenen Interessen über die Gemeinschaft und das Recht stellt, sich also eine dem Menschen unnatürliche Position anmaßt [De tyranno Cap. 1, §§ 7-8, S. 9]. Da die dem Menschen natürliche Position im Kosmos oder im Schöpfungsplan nur dadurch wirklich wird, dass sie immer wieder im konkreten Leben erkannt, realisiert und wirksam gemacht wird, kann sie auch, wie im Falle des Tyrannen, verspielt bzw. muss sie wiedergewonnen werden. Die Tatsache, dass man sich wie der Mönch aus dem täglichen Geschäft, oder wie der Tyrann und der materialistische Philosoph von der natürlichen Ordnung verabschieden kann, widerlegt nicht diese metaphysisch-theologische Ordnung, sie zeigt nur die erzieherische Herausforderung, sie zum Tragen zu bringen.
Um dies zu zeigen, hat Salutati eine Schrift zum Vergleich der Disziplinen Jurisprudenz und Medizin verfasst. Vordergründig geht es um den Vorrang der Universitätsfakultäten, denn die Medizin stand traditionell in höherem Ansehen. (Man darf das Thema auch nicht mit Immanuel Kants "Streit der Fakultäten" verwechseln, die auf die seit der Reformation unaufgelöste Spannung zwischen Theologie und Philosophie eingeht.) Von Anfang an aber ist die Absicht anthropologischer Art, denn "es gebieten die Gesetze ihrerseits den Menschen und lenken ihre Handlungen, damit sie ihre Grenzen nicht überschreiten, ja es nichteinmal versuchen." [De nobilitate legum et medicinae, Proemium, p. 6.] Aus dieser Perspektive ist die Bestimmung der Rangordnung zweier Disziplinen in Wirklichkeit eine Bestimmung des Rangs der Humanität oder der Würde. Dementsprechend beginnt der Traktat mit einer Definition von nobilitas, was man als Dignität, Würde oder Adel übersetzen kann. An den Zwölf Stämmen Israel macht Salutati deutlich, dass solcher 'Adel' gerade nicht aus der Geburt abgeleitet ist, sondern aus virtus, und im Gleichrang der Stämme ist ausgedrückt, dass jedes Volk und jeder Mensch berufen ist. [De nobilitate 1, p. 8-10.] Virtus wird hier mit "gnarus", d.h. "scientia [et] virtutibus excellens" paraphrasiert, also allseitig erfahren [p. 10]. Damit ist schon im Ansaz vorgegeben, dass die Dignität der wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen aus dem Dienst an der individuellen und gesellschaftlichen Erfahrung bemessen wird. Obwohl es also möglich und im individuellen Fall sogar empfehlenswert ist, der Welt zu entsagen, bemißt sich doch der humane Wert einer Tätigkeit nach dem Beitrag, den sie zu eben dieser Bestimmung des Menschen und der Gemeinschaft leistet, selbstverständlich im Einklang mit der göttlichen Ordnung und der Natur. Die Würde des Menschen ist seine Tätigkeit.
Mit Tugend befassen sich natürlicherweise auch Salutatis zahlreiche privaten Briefe und seine Interpretation der antiken Mythologie (De laboribus Herculis). So unterstellt er z.B. in einem frühen Brief, dass die Auseinandersetzung mit antiker Religion und Mythologie gleichbedeutend mit der Suche nach Modellen des tugendhaften Handelns ist. Diese methodische Annahme macht es möglich, pagane Literatur in christlicher Erziehung zu verwenden. [Novati 1, S. 9-12] Denn sie impliziert, daß nicht statische Welten der Götter, der Menschen oder der Helden repräsentiert werden, sondern Paradigmen des Handelns, das dem Menschen möglich und zu- oder abträglich ist. Menschliche Dichtung, so sagt er in seinem Buch über Herkules, ist Schöpfung von Geschöpfen um deren Handeln willen. So wie man in Gott inneres und äußeres Handeln bedenken kann (nämlich den Akt der Schöpfung und die Kreatur), so offenbar auch in den Kreationen der heidnischen Dichter. [De laboribus Herculis 2, 2, S. 82.] Aus demselben Grund ist die Herkules-Mythologie nicht nur ein Beispiel der Kompatibilität paganer und christlicher Theologie, sondern auch die Figur des Halbgotts ein Paradigma des Humanen. An ihm läßt sich die Spannweite menschlicher Tugend explizieren: Es ist dem Menschen eigen, sowohl moralisch ins Bestialische wie auch ins Göttliche auszugreifen. Die antiken Dichter haben an Herkules ausgearbeitet, was die Schwächen und die Stärken des Menschen sind. [De laboribus Herculis 3, 5, S. 176-177.] Demgemäß verweilt Salutati auch beim Abstieg des Helden in die Hölle/Unterwelt, um zu zeigen, daß die menschliche Natur an das Körperliche gebunden ist, zudem aber noch die Sinnlichkeit über die Rationalität herrschen kann. [De laboribus Herculis 4, tract. 2, 1, S. 527 f.] Obwohl Salutati hier traditionelle Denkformen übernimmt, ausdrücklich z.B. den durch Macrobius vermittelten Platonismus, richtet sich die Interpretation auf die Besonderheit des Menschen, für die Extreme frei zu sein. Weiterhin neuplatonische Darstellungsformen übernehmend argumentiert Salutati abschließend, dass die höchste Stufe menschlicher Tugend, die des Heros, nicht mehr vom Willen abhängt sondern vom Hingerissensein: In der vollkommenen Tugendhaltung liegt die wahre Entscheidungsfreiheit, indem der Wille die Alternative wählt, welche die wahre Vernunft will, und das heißt eigentlich, daß der Wille nicht wählt, sondern ohne diskursives Abwägen dorthin gezogen wird. [De laboribus Herculis 4, tract. 2, 7, S. 558.] Die Denkfigur ist dieselbe wie zuvor: Das Potential des Menschen schwankt zwischen dem transzendenten Maßstab des absolut Vollkommenen und dem nahezu vollständigen Verlust des Humanen, und das heißt, Menschsein ist in dieser Spannweite aktiv.
In seinen zahlreichen Briefen findet Salutati Gelegenheit, Teile dieser Sicht des Menschen auszuarbeiten, denn das Briefkorpus ist an sich schon intendiert, theoretisches und praktisches Leben zu verbinden und Normen menschlich verbindlich zu machen. In einem Brief, in dem er als Jurist einen Musterfall erläutert, der Tyrannei und Vater-Sohn-Beziehungen betrifft,  ermahnt er zuerst, Adel (nobilitas) durch Studium der artes liberales zu erfüllen, um von dort die Stellung des Menschen in der Seinshierarchie auszubreiten: Der Mensch, so heißt es im Anschluß an die theologische Tradition (z.B. Thomas von Aquin, De veritate 8.15 c, und S. Th. I-II q. 2 a. 8 arg. 1; Dionysios Areopagita, De divinis nominibus 7), ist wesentlich verschieden von den Tieren dank des Intellekts, der es dem Menschen erlaubt, an die Grenzen des Engels-Intellekts zu rühren. Insofern im Rahmen dieses Denkens Engel der Inbegriff vollkommenen Verstehens sind, folgt für Salutati daraus der Imperativ, sich über das Menschliche zu erheben, nicht aus Hochmut, sondern durch Tugenden, Fleiß, Ansporn und Wissen (virtutibus, industria, studio et doctrina). [Novati 2, nr. 19, S. 202-204.] Nobilitas ist für Salutati durchwegs kein Rang sondern der Appell an das aktive Verwirklichen menschlicher Tugend und Selbstübersteigung. [Novati 1, nr. 2, S. 56-58, und öfter.]  Auch im Alter verteidigte Salutati das Studium der Freien Künste, einschließlich der Lektüre heidnischer Quellen, um das Streben des Menschen zu fördern. Die zuvor geführte Diskussion um den Rang der Disziplinen ist deshalb auch eine um den Vorrang des Willens über dem Intellekt, allerdings so, daß der Wille nicht ziellos ist, sondern den Menschen übersteigt, indem er das als wahr erkannte zum Objekt des Strebens macht. [Novati 4,1, nr. 24, S. 213 f.]

III.

Mit Salutati faßt der – später so bezeichnete – Humanismus in Florenz und ganz Italien Fuß, da es dem Politiker und Gelehrten gelingt, viele Kreise intellektuell anzusprechen: die Universitäts- und Kirchengelehrten durch seine respektvolle Auseinandersetzung mit der spätscholastischen Wissenschaft, die Florentiner Bürger mit der Einführung von Neuerungen in der Bildung (Berufung griechischer Dozenten und populärer Prediger), und politisch denkende Zeitgenossen durch seine Fachkenntnisse in Geschichte und Recht. Die beiden bekanntesten Traktate zur „Menschenwürde“ in der Renaissance wurden der von Giannozzo Manetti (1396-1459) über „Die Würde und Auszeichnung des Menschen“ und Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s (1463-1494) Rede über „Die Würde des Menschen“. Vergleicht man Salutatis Denkweise mit den Argumenten des ebenfalls im frühen 15. Jahrhundert schreibenden Bartolomeo Facio (1400-1457), der von einem Benediktiner angeregt ebenfalls wie Manetti auf eine Schrift von Papst Innozenz III. „Über das Elend des Menschen“ antwortet, so wird der neue, humanistische Ansatz deutlich: Facios Rede über die Würde und des mittelalterlichen Papstes Diatribe sind im Grunde austauschbar, weil sie von einem statischen ontologischen Menschheitsbegriff ausgehen. Der Mensch ist in dieser Welt unvollkommen und elendig, hat aber das Versprechen des ewigen Glücks dank seiner Ausstattung mit Intellekt in einer unsterblichen Seele. Die Würde des Menschen besteht somit im Verlassen des Elends irdischen Lebens. Manetti dagegen arbeitet wissenschaftlich exakt die körperlichen Eigenschaften des Menschen aus, die ihn von Tieren abheben, sodann die Natur der menschlichen Seele, ganz im Geist der Lehre vom Menschen als Abbild Gottes aber unter Betonung des Willens, und schließlich das Zusammenwirken beider im Menschen als Menschen. Man darf das als Versuch der Überwindung sowohl des naturalistischen Reduktionismus als auch zur Bannung des Leib-Seele Dualismus lesen, Denkformen die immer dann auftauchen können, wenn die Rolle des Menschen in der Welt betont wird. Ganz im Einklang mit Salutatis Voluntarismus lehrt auch Manetti, daß der Mensch sein Potential schon im konkreten individuellen Leben ausnützen und optimieren kann. Das heißt auch, daß der Mensch Gestalter seiner sozialen und natürlichen Welt sein kann und darf. Giovanni Pico vereinfacht und radikalisiert diese neue Anthropologie. Er vereinfacht sie, indem er in seiner Rede das Ziel des Menschen in der Annäherung an Gott sieht und daher besonders auf die intellektuellen und kontemplativen Fähigkeiten hinweist. (Zu diesem Zweck entwirft er ein Programm der Übereinstimmung aller Philosophien und Theologien, das eigentliche Ziel der Rede.) Pico radikalisiert die humanistische Forderung zur Verwirklichung der Menschenwürde, indem er nun feststellt, daß der Mensch nicht exakt in der Mitte zwischen Engeln und Tieren angesiedelt sondern überhaupt nicht ontologisch determiniert ist. Der Wille zur Selbstbehauptung verschärft sich zur ontologischen Unbestimmtheit und zum Zwang und zur Aufgabe, seinen Platz im Kosmos selbst zu finden und einzunehmen. In der Bildsprache der Rede kann der Mensch sowohl ein Tier als auch Gottes Sohn sein. D.h. Vereinigung mit Gott bleibt das Ziel. Man darf daher als Interpretationsaufgabe vermuten, daß Salutatis Vertrauen in die Mitwirkung Gottes und die Autonomie des Menschen sich in der frühen Neuzeit aufspalten wird in protestantische Negation der Willensfreiheit, vereint mit Unterwerfung unter die Vorsehung, und in den cartesischen Dualismus, der im „ich denke“ den Garanten der Humanität sah, während die physische Natur, einschließlich des menschlichen Körpers, Objekt aber nicht mitwirkende Grundlage des Denkens wurde. Da für die Humanisten die ontologische Dignität des Menschen in der Selbst-Bestimmung des individuellen und sozialen Handelns lag, mußte in der frühen Neuzeit naturrechtliches Denken die Regeln erkunden.


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Wednesday, June 1, 2011

Aims and Means of Early Jesuit Education

Cultivating Talents and Social Responsibility
Aims and Means of Early Jesuit Education

The Prefect of the Inferior Classes "should by all means support the Rector in guiding and organizing our schools, so that all students make progress no less in the Liberal Arts than in their conduct of life."[1] The Inferior Classes at Jesuit colleges, for which these rules of the Ratio studiorum were crafted in 1599, comprised what elsewhere was termed studia humanitatis, that is, Latin Grammar, Greek, poetry, and rhetoric. Thus, they were the introductory studies before students could move over to philosophy and eventually theology. This first rule, expressly designated as the 'aim' of the Prefect, creates an unmistakable link between moral conduct and academic learning.
So, moral conduct is an aim of education that goes on par with scholarly learning. But one might think that this simply refers to the individual moral perfection of the student. And, indeed, the rules for students seemingly confirm this individualistic view: "Our students should, in the first place, care for the purity of their souls and for the right attitude towards studies; nothing else should they seek therein but God's glory and the fruit for the souls."[2]
Still, one should remember that the spirit of Saint Ignatius was always two-fold: He was a convert soldier and his initial idea was to foster individual spirituality, as is best expressed in his Exercises. On the other hand, he endeavored to save the souls of the Roman Christians by preaching, but soon it dawned on him and his fellows that their mission should extend to recover the newly apostate protestant populations. It was this expansion that would shape the image of Ignatius and his Society of Jesus.[3] Soon the Society engaged in founding colleges and universities, thus becoming a "teaching Order".[4]
The aim which the Society of Jesus directly seeks is to aid its own members and their neighbors to attain the ultimate end for which they were created. … Therefore … it will be necessary to provide for the edifice of [the Jesuits'] learning and the manner of employing it, that these may be aids towards better knowledge and [better] service of God, our Creator and Lord. Toward achieving this purpose the Society takes charge of the colleges and also of some universities, that in them those who prove themselves worthy in these houses but have entered the Society unequipped with the necessary learning may receive instruction in it and the other means of helping souls.[5]
This purposeful declaration should be surprising to all who have learned in their philosophy core course, that the Liberal Arts are 'liberal' because they pursue knowledge for knowledge's sake. In Catholic Reformation, studies aim at some employment: in the knowledge of God and in 'helping souls'. The individual perfection and the care for the souls of others seem intimately conjoined and depend on one another. And they are so to say stimulated by the emphatic repetition of magis/"more". Everything else follows from these premises. The spirit of outreach, of improvement, of teleology, of perfection in the sense not of perfected achievement but of permanent task is clearly present in the very justification of drafting a Constitution: Even though it lies in Divine providence to "preserve, direct, and carry forward" the Society of Jesus, on its part and as its way of cooperating with providence, it needs some constitution "to aid us to proceed better … along the path of divine service on which we have entered."[6] We are used to associate the idea of progress with the Baconian project, and with Enlightenment, and this is correct if we think of it in merely secular terms. For it was secularization that allowed humans to strive for improvement of wisdom by way of accumulation of knowledge and that could pretend to improve individual and social welfare by securing abundant means of survival. However, Ignatius and the early Jesuits appropriated the old metaphor of the Christian as viator, as being on the way, but they gave it a two-fold meaning, an individual and a societal one. As I said before, the perfection of the individual soul is at stake, but the Constitutions, and even more the Ratio studiorum declared that this goal can only be achieved by extending our operation to the world within which we live. The educational program of the early Jesuits clearly shows that scholarly achievements, personal salvation, and engagement for the other are not mutually exclusive; rather, care for the soul always includes caring for the souls of all. The comparative mode in the formula AMDG ("To the greater glory of God") extended over all activities. After all, if God is great, what can multiply His glory? What increases is the devotion in the believers, and the number of believers, too.
Now if we look for further indications regarding social engagement in early Jesuit education, there is not much, at least on the surface. However it should be noted that already in the Constitutions there is an "Instruction of the Scholastics (i.e., students) in the means of helping their neighbor," which draws upon the above mentioned ends of the Society of Jesus for which the students should "accustom themselves to the spiritual arms which they must employ in aiding their neighbor."[7] Even more importantly than that, poor students were admitted from the very beginning. The rules for the Prefect of Studies state: "He may not exclude an applicant, because he is not of noble origin or he his poor."[8] This is an enforcement of the ruling of the Constitutions that had suggested the acceptance of some poor students, even without their intention to enter the Order. They were to be admitted in case there was a shortage of other applicants, and this included even those potential students who – although they were of noble birth and well-off background –  had to sustain themselves.[9] This led eventually to a number of 'houses for poor students' (domus pauperum studiosorum) in many places. In Paris, for instance, a special ruling was necessary, given the sociological phenomenon of impoverished nobility: it was decided that in such colleges that young noblemen, even though they were relatively poor, were not to be preferred over those who "are really poor, provided they are equal in intelligence, habit etc."[10]
All this looks quite encouraging. But for the sake of raising awareness of the specific method of education in the Ignatian spirit, let us of think of alternatives. Not long after the Jesuit Order had been founded and the education had been systematized, Tommaso Campanella and Francis Bacon drafted their view of science, education, and society. Bacon was already mentioned. In the "House of Salomon" of his New Atlantis (1626) plenty of research is going on, but clearly on a quantitative and expansive, rather than intensive, scale. Even though there is a dab of natural theology like whipped cream on top of all the New Atlantis, and morally good behavior is strongly recommended, there is no word about the education of the individual, for – it seems – Bacon believed that the improvement of the person comes automatically with technological advancement. His scientological approach, as we may term it, has no real place for the education of man as such. The Dominican friar Campanella had well thought about individuals and their education in his City of the Sun (1600). But as is well known, his solution has an air of communism in that personhood finds its perfection in annihilation in a happy society of brothers. Much more than in Bacon, the "City of the Sun" depends on God's presence. Even more, it is ultimately a system of worship, though again at the cost of individual development. In Campanella, education is part of his social engineering: expose people to truth, keep them from private interest, and they will be good. That's what was on the market at the time when Jesuit schools flourished. If there was any serious alternative around 1600, it was the "Pious Schools" of the Piarists, originated in 1597, by Joseph of Calasanz, and directly aimed at poor children in Rome. Eventually, in the late 18th century, the Piarist Order would replace the educational monopoly the Jesuits had, especially in the Habsburg Empire – but this is another story.[11]
As is well known, the proletariat as such was not the key target of the Jesuits, but rather Christianity on a whole, yet it's apostolate was nonetheless meant politically. The role of the confessors at several European courts from the mid 16th century on had been criticized and eventually it endangered the existence of the Order. As Robert Bireley, S.J., has pointed out, key to the engagement at the courts was an instruction by Saint Ignatius to the effect that there is nothing wrong with pastoral care of the higher classes, including nobility, especially if they act as generous promoters of the Catholic cause. Moreover, spiritual guidance to a prince benefits all subjects in the same way as all members of a body share the well being of the head.[12] Now there was and would be plenty of room for historical and critical remarks on the political involvement of some fathers, starting from within the Order moving over to its critics. But this is not at stake here. Ignatius's attitude repeats the pattern that I have tried to highlight in all the previous references and which I want to repeat now:
The Glory of God and its increase
The salvation of the individual
The responsibility for the community
All three are marked by transcending each other mutually, which becomes quite clear as soon as one translates them into more familiar words: Worship is open to improvement; it is done both for God and for the care of the soul; and this can only be achieved by transcending the individual concern towards the community in which the individual factually lives. So, in search for social responsibility we are seemingly diverted to another focus of attention: the individual. For all references adduced so far evolve around the individual student, the personal target of ministry, even though everything seems to aim at the community. Paradoxically, Jesuit mission begins with the individual; mission being understood in the broadest sense of the word, and individual in an anthropological sense.
In order to prove my point I should like to draw upon one key text of early Jesuit education, namely Antonio Possevino's Cultura ingeniorum – which should translate as "Cultivation of Talents", but in a more loose sense could be rendered as "Culture of the individual". Possevino (+1611) was one of the great missionaries of his Order. He organized schools in the Baltics and in Transilvania, he negotiated with princes all over Europe, and he also wrote two important books that, on the surface, are something like commented bibliographies. But in many parts, the books expand to well pondered studies on the meaning of scholarship in general and an assessment of special areas. The book covering Theology had the title Apparatus sacer – "Sacred warehouse" and came out in 1603-08, the book covering humanities came out first in 1593 and was called Bibliotheca selecta – "Selected library" with the subtitle: "On the ratio studiorum [or rather, "on how to study"] for the sake of disciplines and salvation for all peoples."[13] Again, we see the view widen from what is at hand to universal salvation.
The book initiates with a chapter, which from the second edition on, had the headline just mentioned. On a whole, it is a treatise on education, or more specifically on the initiation to the liberal arts. Not surprisingly, the treatise states the humanist view of human dignity, i.e., man as the median creature between angels and beasts: God has given to man the upright stature so that his spiritual eye may look to where his face is directed, he says. But for the rest, man is dependent on the earth which he may scrutinize and where he may gain virtue in order to proceed on his way to God. Note the circular movement of the images.
On his way to learn about the world and his own destiny, man has been bestowed with senses, teachers, and tradition. The senses not simply help to experience reality; they are the condition for man to read the book of wisdom, namely the world which has been created for man's instruction. And I may note that Possevino is echoing here a tenet of natural theology.[14] Now in order to understand this book there are the angels, who according to traditional cosmology keep the outer universe revolving and thus transmit God's gifts to nature. Moreover, there are also human teachers and educators, as we might expect to see in a pedagogical treatise. However, in addition to these there are the sages of the Old Testament, as well as the pagan Greeks and Romans, who all – in their ways – witness the power and wisdom of God. Again, we observe a standard humanist motive. But it is employed for the purpose of stating that all and any wisdom is a gift from God.
The latter thought is expanded by reference to the tradition of tradition, as I would call it, namely a brief history of academic teaching from the Ancients, through the Apostles up to the academic teaching of the present time. So, as you can see, I am doing in my way what Possevino had done 400 years ago: I am making a point by recapitulating the history of my topic.
Possevino then addresses the question of human error and identifies three reasons for it: Sin, imprudence, and method. As for sin, a favorite issue in protestant epistemology, Possevino condenses his point to the observation that wisdom and religion must be equally nursed in order to direct one's life in all its activities towards the highest good. Having spoken to the heretics of his time, Possevino's statement means that beatitude can, and can only be achieved by a pious and wise approach to real life. To Catholic teachers and students, this statement exhorts them to have confidence in learning and piety towards it and not to lose salvation from sight.
The second reason for the failure of human wisdom was imprudence in the sense of not considering the true capabilities of the human mind. Evidently here, Possevino comes to the core of his message: There is no point in teaching young people without examining the actual talent they have. Talent [ingenium] is simply defined as the ability to learn with more or less effort the doctrines and arts.[15] With the help of Aristotle, Plato, medical tradition, and the Church Fathers, Possevino insists that human individuals are diverse.
The author then explains the origin and extent of diversity in talent among students. The thrust of his argument is that such talent is not identical with nature, and not unchangeably determined by nature: otherwise learning and education would be futile. And even if we assume that some people are less gifted than others, this is not to be mistaken for legal disenfranchisement. Commenting upon Aristotle's famous distinction concerning 'natural slaves' (Pol. I 4, 1254a 13), he clearly argues that any servant – whether enslaved through warfare and trade or by charitable choice – is not per se excluded from culture.[16] As to the natural gifts, the rule applies that every person has to till his own soil. All this is based on one elementary assumption, as mentioned above, namely that intellectual aptitudes are of spiritual nature and as such they are God's endowment. Consequently, Possevino rejects any naturalist approach, such as assigning the difference of intelligence to physical and medical conditions, as Girolamo Cardano had tried.[17] Rather, personal development depends on the openness of the pupil to the teaching, and this is ultimately an act of freedom:
For if any be a hearer of the word, and not a doer, he is like unto a man beholding his natural face in a glass: For he beholdeth himself, and goeth his way, and straightway forgetteth what manner of man he was. But whoso looketh into the perfect law of liberty, and continueth therein, he being not a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, this man shall be blessed in his deed.[18]
Possevino equally rejects Juan Huarte's (+1588) notion of ingenium (from whose Examen de los ingenios he had borrowed the title of his treatise) because in a similar naturalist approach he had endeavored to locate the variety of disciplines in the various faculties of the intellect.[19] The divine origin of human faculties entitles the individual to seek for improvement, which is best done, first, by inquiring into personal propensities and strengths and, second, by employing all faculties of the mind towards an education in the full sense. It is the responsibility of the educators to discover, which are the foremost natural gifts of a student. But also, they are to refine or even to suspend their judgment about them, since "it is amazing with how many personal properties one individual differs from the other".[20] After that it lies in the responsibility of the youth to overcome difficulties of learning by care for body and soul through keeping order in his studies. By 'order' Possevino meant to engage all spiritual powers towards the study and not to fragment one's mind by engaging in too many disciplines. So his remedy of imprudence consists in assessing the very personal talent of each individual and, at the same time, fostering all talents of an individual for the sake of learning. Both are necessary conditions to educate a person as a whole. In view of the three basic faculties of the intellect, reason, memory, and will, Possevino maintains that those will waste their efforts who train only reason, or fill their memory, or – unconcerned of both reason and memory – approach scholarship only with apparently pious intentions.[21] Piety alone makes no one wise or prudent. Needless to say, all these recommendations apply for teachers as well.[22]
Possevino, the protagonist of re-catholization, had the salvation of endangered and lost souls in mind, when he wrote about education. Therefore he repeats the circular structure of Ignatian spirituality: The struggle for the greater glory of God depends on well trained individuals who will take over the apostolate for the greater glory of God. He underscores in his treatise what the Constitutions already had stated, namely, that education bestows the students with the arms needed for the struggle in this life. In this sense, all sciences are practical.[23] College education serves two aims, which obviously converge: God's glory and the salvation of souls. Possevino employs a simile to illustrate his point:
The honorable lady Judith – before her attempt at capturing Holophernes – not only prayed and fasted but also dressed up with earrings, sandals, rings, and any female embellishment, to which God added graciousness and splendor. In the same way religious people call eloquence and all disciplines as servants into their fortress, where they serve as shields to fend off the enemies of the Church.


[1] Ratio Studiorum, 1599, Regulae Praefecti Studiorum Inferiorum, n. 1: "ut omni ope atque opera adiuvet in scholis nostris ita regendis ac moderandis, ut, qui eas frequentant, non minus quam in bonis artibus, in vitae probitate proficiant." Unless otherwise cited, all translations are mine.
[2] Ratio Studiorum, 1599, Regulae Scholasticorum Nostrae Societatis, n. 1.
[3] Miguel Batllori, "El mito contrarreformista de San Ignacio anti-Lutero", in Julio Caro Baroja (ed.), Ignacio de Loyola, Magister Artium en París, 1528-1535, San Sebastian: Kutxa, 1991, pp. 87-93.
[4] Cf. "Introductio generalis" in Ladislaus Lukács (ed.), Monumenta Paedagogica Societatis Iesu, vol. 2, Rome: IHSI, 1974, pp. 6*-19*. John W. O'Malley, The First Jesuits, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, chapter 6.
[5] Constitutions, part 4, Preamble, n. 1, in Ignatius of Loyola, The Spiritual Exercises and Selected Works, ed. George E. Ganss, New York: Paulist Press, 1991, p. 293. Never trust a translation! For reasons of smooth style the translator omitted the second "magis"="better" (ad magis cognoscendum, magisque serviendum Deo), which in Latin, too, is not necessary, hence emphatic.
[6] Constitutions (as above), p. 288.
[7] Ibid. p. 296.
[8] Ratio Studiorum, 1599, Regulae Praefecti Studiorum Inferiorum, n. 9.
[9] Constitutiones, IV 3, declaratio B.
[10] Ladislaus Lukács (ed.): Monumenta Paedagogica Societatis Iesu, vol. 4, Rome: IHSI, 1981, mon. 50, X, p. 437.
[11] On religious orders with school ministry see Robert Bireley, The Refashioning of Catholicism 1450-1700, Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1999, pp. 34-35 and 130-132.
[12] Robert Bireley, "Hofbeichtväter und Politik im 17. Jahrhundert, in Michael Sievernich, Günter Switek (ed.), Ignatianisch. Eigenart und Methode der Gesellschaft Jesu, Freiburg: Herder, 1990, pp. 386-403; 387.
[13] 1593: …Qua agitur de ratione studiorum in historia, in disciplinis, in salute omnium procuranda, 1603: … de ratione studiorum, ad disciplinas, et ad salutem omnium gentium procurandam. The following paraphrase will be based on the second edition.
[14] I am referring to Raymundus Sabundus, Theologia naturalis, sive liber creaturarum, 1434.
[15] Chapt. 9.
[16] Chapt. 10.
[17] Chapt. 10, conclusion.
[18] Chapt. 11; James 1.23-25 (King James version).
[19] Chapters 12-17.
[20] Chapt. 18.
[21] Chapt. 20.
[22] Chapt. 22.
[23] Chapt. 32.

Monday, March 22, 2010


Paul Richard Blum, ed.

Philosophers of the Renaissance

Translated by Brian McNeil



Philosophers of the Renaissance introduces readers to philosophical thinking from the end of the Middle Ages through the sixteenth century. International specialists portray the thought of twenty-one individual philosophers, illustrating their life and work and highlighting the importance of their thinking.

Best known among the personalities discussed are Nicholas of Cusa, who combined mathematics with theology; Pico della Mirandola, the first to introduce Hebrew wisdom; Marsilio Ficino, who made the works of Plato accessible to his contemporaries; Pietro Pomponazzi, who challenged the Church with unorthodox teachings; and Tommaso Campanella, who revolutionized philosophy and science while imprisoned.

Philosophers of this period explored a great variety of human knowledge: Greek scholars who had emigrated from Byzantium spread ancient and patristic learning; humanists applied their skills to art, architecture, and the text of the Bible (Leon Battista Alberti and Lorenzo Valla); some debated about methods of scientific research -- always with religion in their mind (Raymond Lull, Agrippa of Nettesheim, Philipp Melanchthon, Petrus Ramus, Bernardino Telesio, Jacopo Zabarella); others pondered the ethical implications (Michel de Montaigne, Luis Vives); or they confronted a radical overturn of the traditional worldview (Francesco Patrizi, Giordano Bruno, Francisco Suárez).

The book weaves together the stories of these thinkers by emphasizing the unity of Renaissance philosophy in its attempt to find a philosophical method, combine religious and political thought, analyze language, and discuss the practical dimension of philosophy. Originally published in German in 1998, the chapters have been thoroughly revised and updated. A chapter on Luis Vives was written specifically for this English edition; an extensive bibliography introduces the reader to the current research on philosophers of the Renaissance.

Paul Richard Blum is T. J. Higgins, S.J., Chair in Philosophy at Loyola University Maryland. The author or editor of eighteen books, Blum is internationally recognized as an eminent authority on the Renaissance.

PRAISE FOR THE BOOK

“Perfect miniatures by well-informed historians of philosophy. Those who are looking for a comprehensive picture of the Renaissance will not find a better book.”—Die Tagespost

"Easily accessible to readers new to Renaissance philosophy, this book illustrates a period of transition that is made evident through individual biographies.”—Theologische Revue


Subjects
1. Philosophy, Renaissance.
2. Philosophers, Medieval.

04/2010 vii, 323 pages
Paper ISBN-10: ISBN-13: 978-0-8132-1726-0 Price: $ 35.95S Book Code: BLPRP